TAC/AA (ad auction game) provides a forum for researchers into strategic bidding in keyword auctions to try out their ideas in an independently simulated setting. We describe an agent that successfully competed in the TAC/AA game, showing in the process how to operationalize game theoretic analysis to develop a very simple, yet highly competent agent. Specifically, we use simulation-based game theory to approximate equilibria in a restricted bidding strategy space, assess their robustness in a normative sense, and argue for relative plausibility of equilibria based on an analogy to a common agent design methodology. Finally, we offer some evidence for the efficacy of equilibrium predictions based on TAC/AA tournament data.
Introduction
Trading Agent Competition (TAC) is a successful forum for research into competitive agent design in an independent, highly complex, simulation environment. The ad auction game was recently introduce with a specific focus on several key strategic aspects of the keyword auction environment, carefully stylized into a TAC/AA simulation. We developed our agent to compete in TAC/AA, focusing primarily on a simulation-based game theoretic approach to enlighten bidding strategy.
There has been much discussion about the normative and descriptive value of Nash equilibria in actual strategic settings such as the one faced by a TAC/AA agent. Historically, the use of game theory has been relatively rare in agent design, even in the TAC tournaments (see Wellman et al. (2006) for an exception). One reason that agent designers often eschew game theoretic techniques is that in general there may be many equilibria, and the problem of equilibrium selection requires coordination among the agents. Additionally, any asymmetric equilibrium requires coordination on roles. Finally, other agents may be imperfectly rational in a variety of ways (for example, buggy). These are valid issues which reveal considerable methodological uncertainty in operationalizing game theoretic techniques even if we believed them to be reasonable in a particular setting (i.e., when opponent agents are rational and attempt to maximize their payoffs). Our main contribution is to offer some general guidance to agent designers in operationalizing game theory, which we illustrate in the context of TAC/AA bidding strategy.
Our bidding strategy analysis restricts the consideration set to discretized linear strategies that compute a fraction of the myopic value per click to bid. We perform simulationbased game theoretic analysis in this restricted strategy space to (a) identify equilibria, (b) suggest equilibrium selection techniques, and (c) evaluate robustness of various possible strategies. We find, for example, that a particularly appealing equilibrium, one reached by iterative best response seeded with truthful bidding, is also very robust and is actually a best response to a range of reasonable opponent strategies.
Finally, we assess predictive value of equilibrium bidding policies derived using simulations based on actual tournament data, finding that predictions progressively improve over the span of the tournament, become relatively accurate on some measures.
The TAC/AA Game
The TAC/AA game features eight autonomous software agents representing advertisers in a simulated keyword ad auction. The advertisers interact with the environment by submitting bids and ads to be shown for a set of keywords over a sequence of 60 simulated days, each lasting 10 seconds. The environment itself is comprised of the publisher (search engine) agent, who collects the bids and ads from the advertisers and displays the ads on the search page ordered by a ranking rule, as well as 90000 users who search for keywords, click on ads, and make purchases (conversions) from the advertisers. Next we describe in some detail the agent tasks and TAC/AA simulator implementation.
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Advertiser Agents
A TAC/AA advertiser agent plays a role of a retailer of home entertainment products. Each product is a combination of a manufacturer and a component (e.g., Lioneer TV). The game features three manufacturers and three components, for a total of nine products. While all advertisers are able to sell all products, every advertiser specializes in a manufacturer and a component. The manufacturer specialization yields a 1.5 factor increase in profits from sales, while component specialization results in a boost (roughly a factor of 1.5) in conversion rates.
An advertiser may submit a bid and an ad for any keyword and on any simulation day, to take effect on the following day. In addition, he may specify a budget constraint that limits spending for each keyword individually, as well as for an entire day. Only two ad types are allowed: generic (default) and targeted, which specifies a product. Advertiser's total payoff is the sum of his revenues from product sales less all per-click costs over the span of a simulation.
Publisher
The publisher has two tasks: ranking advertisers for each keyword and computing advertiser payments per click. An advertiser a is endowed at the beginning of a game (simulation) with a baseline click-through-rate (CTR) e a q for each keyword q, which is only revealed to the publisher. Given a collection of bids b a q , advertisers are ranked by a score b
χ , where χ ∈ [0, 1] is chosen and revealed to advertisers at the beginning of each game. 2 The payments per click are determined according to the generalized secondprice (GSP) scheme (Lahaie and Pennock 2008) . When an advertiser drops out due to saturating a budget constraint, rank and payments per click are recomputed for the remaining ads.
Search Users
Each of 90000 users has a specific product preference and will only purchase his preferred product. User preferences are distributed evenly across all products.
A user may submit three kinds of queries (keywords): F0, F1, and F2. A unique F0 query specifies neither the manufacturer nor the component of the user's preferred product. Six F1 queries partially reveal a user's preference: three specify only the manufacturer and three only the component of the desired product. Finally, nine F2 queries completely reveal the user's preferred product (specify both the manufacturer and the component).
A user's behavior is determined by his "state". Indeed, a user may not even submit search queries, or may submit queries and click on ads with no intent to purchase. In the latter case, such "informational" users select uniformly among the three queries (F0, F1, or F2) to submit to the publisher. Finally, a "focused shopper" submits a query depending on his "focus level" (0, 1, or 2) corresponding to the three keyword classes above (thus, for example, a user in focus level 1 submits a F1 query). A user in a focused state makes a purchase (given a click) with conversion probability described below. Transitions between user states are Markovian, but non-stationary, as any user who actually makes a purchase is effectively "reset". As such, user state distribution is affected by advertiser decisions.
After a keyword search, a user proceeds down the list of ads in a Markovian fashion, clicking on an ad he currently "views" with probability determined by the baseline CTR e a q 2 See Lahaie and Pennock (2008) for a discussion of this class of ranking rules.
of that ad, as well as the targeting effect, which is negative if the advertised product does not match a user's preference, positive if it does, and neutral if the ad is generic.
Upon clicking an ad, the probability that a user subsequently makes a purchase depends on three factors: user's state, advertiser's specialty, and advertiser's capacity. Users in an "informational" state may click on ads, but never make a purchase. A focused shopper will purchase with probability η(I d π q , f c ), where η(p, x) = px/(px + (1 − p)), π q is a baseline conversion rate that depends on the keyword q, f c is a factor that is 1.5 if the advertiser specializes in the component preferred by the user and 1 otherwise. Finally,
with C a a capacity constraint of the advertiser, d current day, and c i advertiser's sales on day i. Note that the value of I d on day d changes dynamically with each sale on that day (i.e., as c d changes).
Tournament
15 participants registered for the TAC/AA tournament, which proceeded in three rounds: qualifying rounds, semifinals, and finals. No agents were eliminated in the qualifying rounds, as all were deemed competent enough to proceed. The eight top scoring agents from the semifinal round competed in the finals. While we suppress the name and rank of our agent due to anonymity concerns, we note that it was one of the finalists.
Agent Design
The decision environment in which a TAC/AA agent acts is very complex, with much uncertainty and decision dependence between keywords and days. Thus, the process of designing and building an agent must of necessity involve two aspects: an analysis based on high-level strategic abstraction, as well as low-level implementation details. Our design of agent strategy (high level) had simulation-based game theoretic analysis at its core. To understand this analysis, however, we must first weave together some low-level details, as well as abstraction steps that were undergone before the corresponding game theoretic problem was appropriately defined.
First, we made a grand simplification in agent design by focusing almost exclusively on bidding strategy. As such, our budget was left always entirely unconstrained. Furthermore, we fixed the ad selection policy before any strategic analysis of bidding, hopeful that the specific ad choice has relatively low payoff impact (we revisit this assumption below).
Ad Selection
We choose a generic ad for an F0 keyword and a targeted ad for all others. For a F1 keyword, we choose the product in the ad to match the manufacturer/component in the keyword, while the missing product element of the keyword is filled with the advertiser's specialty. The ad for the F2 keyword matches the product in the keyword.
Bidding Policy
The problem of developing an effective bidding strategy in keyword auctions has received much attention in the literature, but there is relatively little practical evidence of efficacy of any of the proposed techniques. TAC/AA gives us an arguably objective, highly complex, yet still stylized forum to test bidding strategy development.
Perhaps the most natural approach to bidding in a complex multiagent setting like TAC/AA is via a combination of optimization and machine learning. Indeed, machine learning has enjoyed considerable success in TAC games historically (see, for example, Pardoe and Stone (2006) ). Additionally, Kitts and Leblanc (2004) suggested computing a myopic (one-shot) profit maximizing bid given learned regression models of expected position and payment per click. One problem with learning-based approaches is that they do not prescribe what should be done in the absence of any information about the adversaries. Additionally, they assume that adversary behavior is stationary and, thus, past behavior is a good predictor of future behavior. In fact, learning may take some time before its prescriptions are effective, and the opponents will often be learning themselves, creating complex interactions between the learning algorithms, with policies that are unlikely to be stationary.
We steer away from learning-based approaches entirely, with our bidding policy determined by a simulation-based equilibrium estimate. We do so not to suggest that learning is a lost cause; rather, we follow a precise research agenda: developing an agent that plays an equilibrium strategy alone allows us to directly measure the efficacy of a pure game theoretic approach. Success of our approach will, thus, make a good case for equilibrium as initial prediction and strategic prescription, while further online exploration may or may not lead an agent to play other, more promising strategies.
In order to apply simulation-based game theoretic techniques to bidding, we need to first abstract the complex environment of TAC/AA into a computationally tractable restricted bidding strategy class. We do so following the prescription of Vorobeychik (2009) , who proposes and motivates linear bidding strategies of the form b(v) = αv, where v is an advertiser's value per click. Note that this bidding function is entirely myopic, as it contains no temporal dependence (or any other state information about the game that may be available). On the other hand, it is very simple to implement and highly intuitive: an agent is asked to determine what fraction of his value he wishes to bid. Indeed, particularly due to the similarity of the GSP price mechanism to Vickrey auction, a very natural strategy would be to bid one's value, setting α = 1. Vorobeychik (2009) cautions against this, as he notes that there are substantial incentives to lie in a one-shot version of the keyword auction, but perhaps such incentives are dulled in a repeated game?
While we have now a concrete class of bidding strategies to focus on, we have yet another question to answer before we can proceed to the actual analysis stage: as value per click is not directly given, how do we derive it from the TAC/AA specification and/or game experience? We devote the next section to this question.
Estimating Value Per Click
A value per click of an advertiser a for a keyword q is the expected revenue from a click, or
Revenue from a conversion depends entirely on whether the manufacturer in the keyword (user preference) matches the advertiser's specialty. If the manufacturer is specified in the keyword, the revenue is $15 if it matches the specialty and $10 otherwise. If not, we can compute expected revenue to be 35 3 by noting that there is a 1/3 chance of a specialty match.
To compute the conversion probability, we need to estimate two things: the proportion of focused shoppers and the (expected) value of I d . We begin with the former, assuming that an estimate of I d is available. Since the proportion of focused shoppers actually depends on agent policies, we obtain an initial estimate using an arbitrary fixed policy, use the result to estimate bidding equilibria, and then refine the estimate using equilibrium bidding policies.
3 If we fix agent policies, the proportion of focused shoppers on a given day for a keyword q can be computed as the ratio of the empirical fraction of clicks that result in purchases and the estimate of conversion probability of a focused shopper. We average such empirical proportions for every simulation day over 100-130 simulations to obtain a daily estimate of expected proportion of focused shoppers for each keyword. Suppose that we are estimating value per click on day d for tomorrow (day d + 1). In order to compute the value of I d+1 , we need sales information for the three days that precede day d, as well as total sales for day d. Additionally, the value of I d+1 (and, hence, value per click) is not actually fixed but will change with every additional sale on day d+1. We do have accurate information about sales on d − 1, d − 2, and d − 3. Furthermore, we can estimate the expected sales on day d as the product of CTR, today's conversion rate, and the total number of impressions. While we know none of these exactly, we can estimate each with reasonable accuracy. First, CTR can be estimated as the average observed CTR throughout the game. Today's conversion rate requires estimating I d , for which we have data from all days except current. We obtain a conservative (high) estimate for today's conversion rate by only using those "known" sales in computing I d (which in the end underestimates value per click for d + 1). The total number of impressions for each day of every keyword is estimated by running 100-130 simulations offline and averaging the number of observed impressions, using a fixed agent policy vector, just as in estimating focused shopper proportions. Next, we project total sales on day d + 1 using again a conservative estimate of the conversion rate that would be effective at the beginning of that day. Finally, since value is roughly linear in I d+1 , we compute average I d+1 over each incremental sale made on day d + 1. 
Simulation-Based Game Theoretic Analysis
Having restricted our bidding strategies to be of the form b(v) = αv, we use simulation-based game theoretic analysis to estimate an equilibrium in this strategy space. We note that an equilibrium estimated in the analysis actually plays a dual role, one predictive, describing what other agents will do, and one prescriptive, telling us how to optimally respond to that prediction. In order to operationalize an equilibrium solution in the prescriptive context, we make a substantial further restriction and focus only on symmetric strategy profiles, that is, restrict all agents to follow the same bidding strategy b(v). Hence, we use α to refer both to a specific bidding strategy and to a symmetric profile of these. There are two key reasons for restricting attention to symmetric profiles. First, an asymmetric equilibrium is difficult to operationalize, since it is not clear (when agents are ex-ante symmetric) which role our agent should play. Second, even if we pick a role for our agent, we still must assume that others coordinate on their respective roles just as we predict (at the minimum, no other agent may chooses our agent's role). Furthermore, we do not necessarily lose much by the restriction from the descriptive standpoint, since the agent ultimate cares about other players' choices only in the aggregate, insofar as they impact CTR and payments, and it seems reasonable that this is sufficiently captured by a symmetric equilibrium profile.
Since bids should be strictly positive to ensure any profit and, myopically, there is no reason to bid above value per click, we restrict α to the (0, 1] interval. Furthermore, to enable a more detailed analysis, we limit our equilibrium search to a discrete grid {0.1, 0.2, . . . , 1}.
One major hurdle in equilibrium-based agent design is the issue of equilibrium selection. Since in our case equilibrium would offer both a prediction of opponent play and a best response to it, the goal, if we are to choose an equilibrium, is to choose one that yields the most plausible such prediction.
A common and highly effective technique employed in designing computational agents to compete against others is self-play (for example, Tesauro's TD-Gammon agent was developed in such a way (Tesauro 1995) ). While this approach is usually applied at the level of individual game decisions when opponents move sequentially, we can detect a rough correspondence between self-play and a well-known iterative best response dynamic, where a player computes a maximizing action in each iteration assuming stationary opponents. In our case, iterative best response would proceed by first selecting a starting (seed) symmetric profile α 0 , approximating a single-agent best response strategyα 0 to it, then setting the symmetric profile in the next iteration to be α 1 =α 0 . If this process converges and best responses are truly optimal, it necessarily converges to a Nash equilibrium α * . The fact that the process can be viewed as roughly analogous to self-play suggests that equilibria found in such a manner may have good predictive properties, at least regarding the most competent of opponents. However, the dynamic itself is not sufficient: even if we believe other agents to follow a similar process, all need to agree on a starting point α 0 . The choice of a starting point would, in general, be informed by whatever conventions govern typical algorithmic design in specific domains. In the context of auctions with one-dimensional valuations (such as our case), a rather focal starting point is truthful bidding, particularly so since GSP is reminiscent of Vickrey auctions which are, in fact, truthful. Hence, setting α 0 = 1 seems a very reasonable way to seed a best response dynamic in a way that would lead to good predictions.
Following this approach, we obtained the equilibrium strategy for the purposes of the tournament via several iterations of best response dynamics starting at α = 1. A look at Figure 1 (left) shows that a best response to a symmetric strategy profile with α = 1 is α = 0.4, and a best response to a symmetric profile with α = 0.4 is α = 0.2, which happens to be a symmetric equilibrium in our restricted policy space. Consequently, we were able to obtain a symmetric equilibrium for the restricted discrete bidding strategy space after only two best response iterations.
Based on the rapid convergence of iterative best response in our setting, we can make another conjecture: the equilibrium that we thus locate is relatively robust in the sense that the equilibrium strategy is a best response (or nearly so) for a number of other opponent strategies besides equilibrium. We suggest that this is another positive side-effect of considering best response dynamics in some settings. Another example of this phenomenon is a first-price sealed-bid auction with private valuations uniformly distributed on a unit interval, where the best response to truthful bidding in the linear strategy space is also a symmetric equilibrium strat- egy.
5 Figure 1 (left) demonstrates this robustness in our case: α = 0.2 is a best response to 0.2, 0.3, and 0.4. Indeed, this figure additionally reveals another equilibrium at α = 0.1, but it is only a best response to itself.
We use additional simulations after the tournament to paint a more complete picture of the best response function in our discrete strategy space depicted in Figure 1 (left), with payoffs for any configuration of agent strategies computed based on 15-30 simulation runs.
6 Several items are noteworthy from Figure 1 . First, we may note that none of α > 0.4 are ever a best response (and all have quite high game theoretic regret, that is, allow very large gains to be had from deviating to another bidding strategy, as seen on Figure 1 , right). This observation alone already dramatically restricts our consideration set, and one may well use such knowledge derived from a game theoretic analysis to proceed with a more traditional machine learning approach. This is a rather general point: game theoretic techniques may often be quite useful to restrict the number of options one needs to consider in learning, resulting, perhaps, in significant improvement in learning performance. In our case, an interesting observation is that the equilibrium α = 0.2 is actually a best response to nearly every reasonable strategy (i.e., α < 0.4, with α = 0.1 being the lone exception) in our restricted space, per above observation.
When deciding on a strategy for an agent in a multiagent system, an important consideration is robustness to uncertainty about opponent decisions. A common way to measure robustness of a particular strategy is via maximum regret, or the most that an agent would have gained by switching to another strategy, maximized over all opponent policies in a specific consideration set. Figure 2 (left) shows max regret of every strategy in response to our entire restricted consideration set, while Figure 2 (right) plots max regret when we restrict opponents to play only "reasonable" strategies. We can observe that α = 0.2 fairs reasonably well in both cases; although α = 0.3 and α = 0.4 are more robust to very ag-gressive opponents (left), if we assume that all opponents are reasonable, α = 0.2 has the smallest regret. In fact, good robustness property of α = 0.3 in the unrestricted opponent setting actually prompted us to use that strategy, rather than 0.2, in the semifinal rounds, due to the risk that some of the agents competing at that stage are still rather unpolished. In contrast, the α = 0.1 equilibrium has relatively poor regret properties in both settings. The upshot of this discussion is that we can augment standard simulation-based game theoretic analysis with an analysis of max regret, as well as game theoretic regret, to allow us to best balance the risks from poor opponent strategy assessment with benefits of optimally responding to our predictions in a given setting.
Some Enhancements
Our discussion above centered around an assumption that the same bidding policy (parametrized by α) is used for any keyword. If we use a state abstraction that captures all relevant strategic aspects of the environment, then there is no loss in utilizing a single bidding policy for all keywords. However, as we focus on policies that only use a myopic value per click, a relatively simple way to compensate for our restriction is to use different policies for different keyword classes. Thus, we may wish to use a bidding strategy that is a vector < α F0 , α F1 , α F2 >, where each component prescribes the bidding strategy for the corresponding keyword. Another natural generalization is to contemplate quadratic bid functions, adding another parameter. As suggested by Vorobeychik (2009) , it is reasonable to assume that the amount of shading (bid reduction) is less when value is small. Consequently, we implement the extension to quadratic bidding policies by specifying a value of α low to use when I d = 0 (and, hence, v = 0), and take the specified α (as above) to be applicable when I d = 1 (value is maximal), with the restriction that α low ≥ α.
We approximate an equilibrium in the enhanced policy space by extending the best response dynamic to begin with the simple equilibrium before any enhancements, then adding a single feature (e.g., α F0 ), obtaining a new equilibrium, then introducing the next feature, and so on. We thus obtained the vector < 0.1, 0.2, 0.2 > and α low = 0.3 for use in the tournament.
Alternative Ad Selection Policies
Having assumed until now that our choice of ad policy is reasonable (and, moreover, that a specific ad policy has relatively little profit impact), we consider two simple alternative ad selection policies. The first, Generic Ad Selection, always chooses a generic ad. The second, Specialty Ad Selection, always chooses the ad to match the product to the advertiser's manufacturer and component specialty. Fortunately, the policy we actually used proved sensible, as it is significantly better than generic at the 0.9 confidence level and empirically (though not statistically significantly) better than the specialty ad selection policy. 7 Predictive Value of Equilibrium: Evidence from Tournament
We close our discussion with some evidence about the descriptive quality of our approximate equilibrium policies from the TAC/AA tournament. In an ad auction, key determinants of an agent's profits are the distributions of CTRs and payments per click as functions of submitted bids. We use the data from tournament qualifying rounds, semifinals, and finals to see whether these distributions appear to converge to equilibrium predictions. We evaluate the error of an equilibrium prediction with respect to the tournament evidence about the distribution of some measure (say, payments per click) as follows. First, we bin all bids from simulated equilibrium and tournament experience of our agent into 50 intervals. For each bid interval, we compute the maximum error between the tournament and equilibrium distributions of the measure of interest (akin to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test), and then compute the weighted average error over all bid intervals, with weights corresponding to the number of bids that fall into each interval. The results, shown in Figure 3 (results for CTR are analogous and we do not show them for lack of space), show a clear downward trend in error as the tournament progresses: as agents become more competent on average, equilibrium
